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Abstract
This article examines the seminal 1992 United States Supreme
Court decision, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,1 specifically focusing on the Lucas nuisance exception. I surveyed approximately 1,600 reported regulatory takings cases decided since the Lucas decision involving Lucas takings challenges. I identified the
statutory nuisance cases in which state and local governments unsuccessfully asserted the Lucas nuisance exception as a defense to the
courts’ findings of a Lucas taking. This article examines the prospective potential of these cases for assisting private property owners in
enhancing private property rights protections within the area of
regulatory takings.
INTRODUCTION
In this article, I revisit the ad hoc and murky regulatory takings doctrine, reflecting on the 1992 United States Supreme Court
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.2 The
Lucas
Court articulated a categorical regulatory takings rule and an exception to that categorical rule. The categorical rule the Court articulated
is that private property owners are entitled to compensation for a taking under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause when a government
“regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land.”3 The Lucas Court acknowledged that the categorical takings
rule was subject to what has become well-known as the “nuisance
exception.”4 When a regulation implicates the Lucas categorical takings rule, the government can avoid the duty to pay compensation if
it can prove that the “proscribed use interests were not part of [the
owner’s] title to begin with.”5 In other words, any limitation that is
severe enough to deprive a private property owner of all economically beneficial use of the owner’s property “cannot be newly legislated
or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself,
in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of

1

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id.
3
Id. at 1015.
4
Id. at 1022-23 (“It is correct that many of our prior opinions have suggested that ‘harmful or noxious uses’ of property may be proscribed by government regulation without the
requirement of compensation.”).
5
Id. at 1027.
2
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property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”6
The Lucas decision exists within the context of two significant United States Supreme Court cases: the 1987 case of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, California7 and the 2002 case of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.8 In First English, the United
States Supreme Court stated that temporary takings that “deny a
landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings,” which clearly must be compensated under the United States Constitution.9 Later, in Tahoe-Sierra, which involved two
temporary development moratoria, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the Lucas categorical takings test.10 The Tahoe-Sierra Court
concluded that the focus should be on the whole parcel, not a temporal slice.11 Additionally, the Tahoe-Sierra Court held that in cases
of prospectively temporary takings, the analysis should be under the
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York12 regulatory
takings balancing test,13 not the Lucas categorical test.14 The TahoeSierra Court, in articulating the whole parcel doctrine, rejected temporal segmentation and admonished the principle that the denominator in regulatory takings cases should consist of the whole parcel.15
To the extent the First English decision left a door open for
temporary, prospective closures of private property pursuant to state
nuisance abatement statutes to constitute Lucas categorical takings,
the Court’s later decision in Tahoe-Sierra closed it.16 Together, these
cases provide an incredibly narrow opening for Lucas takings in this
context - one might say, virtually no opening at all.
To prove the point, I looked at 1,600 reported regulatory takings cases decided since the 1992 Lucas decision.17 I found only four
6
7
8
9

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 318; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011-

12.
10

Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32, 342.
Id. at 331.
12
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
13
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331.
14
Id. at 331-32, 342.
15
Id. at 332.
16
See infra Part II.
17
Id. These 1,600 cases represent all cases available in the two major online databases
(Lexis and Westlaw) that cited Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003. A total of 1,585 cases were drawn
11
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cases in which the property owner succeeded in proving that a Lucas
categorical taking resulted from the application of a state nuisance
abatement statute against the property owner’s private property.18 In
this article, I look at those four cases, examine why the property
owners succeeded in mounting their Lucas challenges, and discuss
lessons learned when Lucas, First English, and Tahoe-Sierra are considered together.19
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the many
Lucas opinions, explaining why the doctrine is so murky and laying
the groundwork for the dispute over the nuisance abatement statutes
in the four statutory nuisance cases. Part II examines the four successful applications of the Lucas categorical takings rule that were
triggered by application of state nuisance abatement statutes, pursuant to which, private property owners were temporarily denied all use
of their property. Part III draws lessons learned from the observations in Parts I and II. I ultimately conclude that these statutory nuisance abatement cases hold little potential for enhancing private
property rights protections because they ignore, even subvert, the
whole parcel rule and the temporary takings decisions by the United
Supreme Court and federal courts since these nuisance abatement
cases were decided.20
I.

THE MANY LUCAS OPINIONS

In 1986, David Lucas, a South Carolina real estate developer,
purchased two lots in a residential subdivision located in South Carolina on the Isle of Palms.21 He intended to construct single-family
homes on the lots; however, his plans were interrupted when, in
1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act (“the Act”), which prohibited Mr. Lucas from placing
any “permanent habitable structures” on the lots.22 At that time, the

from a Lexis Shepard’s Report, and 1,607 cases were drawn from a Westlaw Keycite report.
The majority of the cases appeared on both reports.
18
Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001); City of St. Petersburg v.
Bowen, 675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Rezcallah, 702 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio
1998); City of Seattle v. McCoy, 4 P.3d 159 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
19
See infra Part II.
20
See infra Part III.
21
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07.
22
Id. at 1007.
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Act did not allow for any exceptions.23 Mr. Lucas filed a complaint
and alleged that the Act’s prohibition was a permanent taking of his
private property, entitling him to just compensation.24 The South
Carolina state trial court agreed and ruled that the Act’s prohibition
on construction of any permanent structure left the lots “valueless”
and therefore constituted a total permanent taking of his property.25
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court.26 Important to the South Carolina Supreme Court was Mr. Lucas’s concession that the Act was valid and proper in its design to preserve the
beaches in South Carolina, a public resource.27 The South Carolina
Supreme Court ruled that when the State regulates to prevent uses of
property that will result in serious harm to the public, the State has no
duty to pay compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, regardless of the severity of the effect of the regulation on the value of the private property.28
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the South Carolina Supreme Court ruling. In a 6-2 opinion, the
United States Supreme Court relied upon the South Carolina trial
court’s determination that Mr. Lucas’s lots had been rendered valueless and reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court.29
Once in the United States Supreme Court, the Lucas majority
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, can be conceptualized as no fewer
than three separate rulings. The first ruling is the categorical regula23
Id. at 1009. After Mr. Lucas argued his case before the South Carolina Supreme Court,
the Act was amended to allow a special permit process. Id. at 1010-11. The United States
Supreme Court said that because the South Carolina Supreme Court had earlier decided Mr.
Lucas’s unconditional and permanent takings case on the merits, Mr. Lucas’s permanent takings claim, related to his past deprivation of use was ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 1011-12. The subsequently enacted special permit process would be
relevant to any future permit applications, denials, and takings challenges. Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1011.
24
Id. at 1009.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 1009-10.
28
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010.
29
Id. at 1020, 1030, 1032. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion of the Court in which
Justices Rehnquist, White, O’Connor and Thomas joined. Id. at 1005. Justice Kennedy
wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justices Blackmun and Stevens filed dissenting opinions. Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter filed a separate statement. Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1076 (statement of Souter, J.).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 2 [2014], Art. 9

354

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

tory takings test. The second ruling is the denominator issue and the
whole parcel rule. The third ruling is the “exception” to the categorical rule—the nuisance and background principles defense. Calling
them separate rulings is something of a misnomer as it is exceedingly
difficult, perhaps impossible even, to discuss either one without also
discussing the others.
The defining components of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
have been the source of considerable judicial and scholarly commentary over the years. The majority opinion elicited a separate concurrence by Justice Kennedy, separate dissenting opinions by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, and a separate statement by Justice Souter.30
Reflecting on Lucas as one of the seminal takings cases, regardless of
one’s opinion of the result, it is obvious that these Justices’ responses
to the majority opinion are compelling and insightful.
A.

The Categorical Rule

The Lucas Court articulated a categorical regulatory takings
test: private property owners were entitled to compensation under the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause when a government “regulation
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”31 What
might have initially appeared to be a straightforward rule subsequently elicited debate about whether the Lucas categorical rule turned on
denial of all value or denial of all use.32 In other words, if a regulation eliminated all use but left a property owner with non-speculative
or even speculative value, would the Lucas analysis apply or would
the Penn Central balancing test apply?33 Courts and other legal authorities differ on this point. Some contend that the Court’s opinion
in Tahoe-Sierra endorses loss of value as the Lucas rule.34 “Anything less than a ‘complete elimination of value,’ or a ‘total loss,’ . . .
would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central.”35
30
Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 1076 (statement of
Souter, J.).
31
Id. at 1015-16 (majority opinion).
32
See infra Part III.
33
See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
34
See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Lucas Unspun, 16 S.E. ENVTL. L.J. 13, 28 n.99 (2007)
(discussing the Lucas decision in the context of economic value and citing to the TahoeSierra decision and others as interpreting the Lucas decision in the total diminution of all
value context).
35
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330. See also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,
539 (2005) (stating that “[i]n the Lucas context, of course, the complete elimination of a
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But, other courts and scholars have argued in favor of the loss
of use construction of the Lucas categorical takings rule.36 An understanding of the Lucas categorical takings rule as only applying when
a government regulation deprives an owner of all value would significantly heighten the already substantial impediments to property
owners’ ability to mount successful Lucas challenges. It is difficult
to imagine a situation in which a speculator could not be found who
would pay some de minimis amount for a property even if the property had been completely deprived of all development rights and even
temporarily deprived of all rights of use.37 The law is dynamic, and
this dynamism, with the potential for favorable future regulatory
property’s value is the determinative factor.”); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d
922, 935 (Tex. 1998) (“A restriction denies the landowner all economically viable use of the
property or totally destroys the value of the property if the restriction renders the property
valueless. Determining whether all economically viable use of a property has been denied
entails a relatively simple analysis of whether value remains in the property after the governmental action.”) (citations omitted); Daniel L. Siegel & Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled Principles and Unresolved Questions, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 479, 483 (2010)
(stating that Penn Central is the proper approach for moratoria because Lucas applies only
“when a regulation entirely eliminates a property’s value.”).
36
See, e.g., Res. Inv., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 493 (2009) (stating that
“there appears to be no genuine issue of material fact that Corps’ denial of plaintiffs’ 404
permit application left plaintiffs without economically viable use of the project site. Thus,
plaintiffs’ claim falls under Lucas rather than Tahoe-Sierra and Penn Central, and the
Corps’ denial of the 404 permit may very well have left plaintiffs without economically viable use of their property.) (emphasis added); Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, 231
F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (appearing to analogize the concepts).
A “categorical” taking is, by accepted convention, one in which all economically viable use, i.e., all economic value, has been taken by the regulatory imposition. Such a taking is distinct from a taking that is the
consequence of a regulatory imposition that prohibits or restricts only
some of the uses that would otherwise be available to the property owner, but leaves the owner with substantial viable economic use.
Id.
The Lucas Court indicated two factors that are relevant to determining
whether property has an economically viable use. The first is the remaining market value of the land. If a regulation renders property “valueless”, then no economically viable use remains . . . . The second factor is the remaining uses available to the landowner. The Court gave
little specific guidance for the application of this factor, but did indicate
that a regulation that requires land to be left substantially in its natural
state deprives the owner of economically viable use.
Ann T. Kadlecek, The Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on the Law of Regulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L. REV. 415, 427 (1993) (citations omitted).
37
See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Lucas may put his land
to ‘other uses’—fishing or camping, for example—or may sell his land to his neighbors as a
buffer. In either event, his land is far from ‘valueless.’ ”).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 2 [2014], Art. 9

356

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

change for a property owner, creates speculative value at the right
price point. And, if Lucas is understood as only applying when there
is no value, then it truly is difficult to make the case of a Lucas total
taking. An exception to the proposition articulated above would be
instances in which the lack of development potential combines with
other negative factors such as environmental remediation costs, holding costs, demolition costs, and property tax liability to create “negative value.”38
B.

The Denominator and Whole Parcel Doctrine

Essential to the total takings claim is an analysis of the denominator issue and the whole parcel doctrine. What is the relevant
private property interest against which the regulatory impact will be
measured?39 The Lucas opinion lacks objective guidance for determining the relevant parcel to constitute the denominator.40 The Court
acknowledges that the denominator calculation raises a “difficult
question” and recognizes it has “produced inconsistent pronouncements” as a consequence of “uncertainty regarding the composition
of the denominator.”41 The Lucas majority opinion does not raise the
denominator issue as a central concern because the Court was constrained to accept the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas’ determination that the South Carolina regulation rendered Mr. Lucas’s
lot valueless.42 Justice Scalia addresses it in dictum, as does Justice
Blackmun in his dissent.43
Justice Stevens emphasizes the “unsoundness” of the majority
opinion in light of the elasticity of the concept of private property
rights and the proclivity of owners to manipulate the nature of their
property interest, the denominator, post-Lucas, to improve the odds
of a Lucas takings challenge.44 He explains:

38

City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W.3d 34, 44-45 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).
Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (portending to challenge Penn Central as a seminal decision on the point of the relevant denominator).
40
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (“Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our ‘deprivation of all
economically feasible use’ rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make
clear the ‘property interest’ against which the loss of value is to be measured.”).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1033-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1016 n.7 (majority opinion).
43
Id. at 1016 n.7; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44
Id. at 1065-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39
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[D]evelopers and investors may market specialized estates to take advantage of the Court’s new rule. The
smaller the estate, the more likely that a regulatory
change will effect a total taking. Thus, an investor
may, for example, purchase the right to build a multifamily home on a specific lot, with the result that a
zoning regulation that allows only single-family
homes would render the investor’s property interest
“valueless.” In short, the categorical rule will likely
have one of two effects: Either courts will alter the
definition of the “denominator” in the takings “fraction,” rendering the Court’s categorical rule meaningless, or investors will manipulate the relevant property
interests, giving the Court’s rule sweeping effect.45
Stevens concludes this portion of his dissent by challenging the majority’s three rationales for the categorical rule: that total deprivations
are analogous to physical takings, that the rule will be rarely applied
and therefore will not significantly impact the workings of government, and the risk of undue “ʻsingling out’” of property owners when
regulation leaves these owners with no economically beneficial use
of their lands.46
In fact, a significant number of the successful Lucas cases are
thematically linked by private agreements that the courts found sufficiently reduced the denominator factor so as to trigger a taking.
Whether the impacts of these private agreements reflect intentional
manipulations or unintended consequences is uncertain. What is
clear is that the denominator matters and courts have been willing to
honor private property owners’ purposeful restrictions on their property interests when ascertaining the denominator for Lucas takings
purposes.
Most recently, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Lost
Tree Village Corp. v. United States47 acknowledged the relevant parcel as a critically antecedent determination in the takings analysis.48
Lost Tree, a Florida property owner and land developer, sought a
permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers to fill wet45
46
47
48

Id.
Id. at 1066-67.
707 F.3d 1286.
Id. at 1292.
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lands on a 4.99-acre parcel (“Plat 57”).49 It obtained all applicable
state and local approvals, but the Corps denied Lost Tree’s wetland
fill permit application because it said alternatives were available to
Lost Tree that were “less environmentally damaging.”50 Lost Tree
claimed the denial was a taking of its property.51 The government
disagreed and argued that the relevant parcel for the takings analysis
was the entire John’s Island Community, which consisted of approximately 1,300 acres and which had been developed by Lost Tree
years earlier.52 Lost Tree argued that the relevant parcel was solely
Plat 57.53
The court determined that the relevant parcel was Plat 57
alone and that Lost Tree’s other holdings in the vicinity of Plat 57
could not be aggregated because Lost Tree had established “distinct
economic expectations” for its scattered holdings.54 The court articulated the following guidelines for establishing the denominator composition based on its interpretation of relevant Supreme Court and
other federal precedent. A court’s focus should be on “‘the parcel as
a whole’” doctrine and the doctrine should not be extended to include
the property owner’s disparate properties that are situated in the vicinity of the property subject to regulation.55 Courts should consider
the economic expectations of property owners who own several parcels. If such property owners “‘treat[] several legally distinct parcels
as a single economic unit, together they may constitute the relevant
parcel’” for the takings analysis.56 But, the relevant parcel may be a
subset of a larger purchase of land, even contiguous land, when the
property owner treats the parcels as “distinct economic units” and develops them at different times.57
Of course, the parcel as a whole doctrine predates the Lucas
and Lost Tree decisions and can be traced, most famously, back to the
landmark United States Supreme Court regulatory takings case of

49

Id. at 1288-90.
Id. at 1291.
51
Id. at 1291.
52
Lost Tree, 707 F.3d at 1288, 1291. Lost Tree developed the John’s Island community
beginning in 1969 through the mid-1990s. Id. at 1288.
53
Id. at 1291.
54
Id. at 1294.
55
Id. at 1292-93.
56
Lost Tree, 707 F.3d at 1293.
57
Id.
50
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Penn Central.58 The Penn Central Court articulated a three-part regulatory takings test against which most takings cases are judged.59
The Penn Central Court pronounced that when applying the threepart test and judging the extent and nature of the government’s interference with a property owner’s rights, the Court will focus on the
nature of the regulation’s interference with the owner’s rights in the
whole parcel on the grounds that “ʻ[t]aking’ jurisprudence does not
divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.”60 A few years later in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis,61 the Court reiterated its commitment to the parcel as a
whole when constituting the denominator and determining whether a
regulation worked a taking of private property for Fifth Amendment
purposes.62
C.

The Nuisance and Background Principles Defense

The Lucas Court held that the categorical taking rule was subject to what has become well-known as the nuisance exception.63
When a regulation implicates the Lucas categorical taking rule, the
government can avoid the duty to pay compensation if it can prove
that the “proscribed use interests were not part of [the owner’s] title
to begin with.”64 Effectively, the government must demonstrate that
the regulation’s results could have been achieved judicially under the
State’s “background principles of nuisance and property law.”65
The Lucas Court also rejected the harm prevention and benefit conferring logic as a basis for distinguishing constitutional takings
by regulation that require compensation from regulatory deprivations

58

438 U.S. 104.
Id. at 124. In deciding whether a government action amounts to a regulatory takings,
courts will consider three factors: (1) “the extent to which the regulation” interferes with the
property owner’s “distinct investment-backed expectations;” (2) the character of the regulatory action, whether its characteristics are similar to government physical invasions; and (3)
the regulation’s economic impact on the property owner. Id.
60
Id. at 130.
61
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
62
Id. at 497.
63
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1067-68.
64
Id. at 1027.
65
Id. at 1031. See McQueen v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003)
(relying on the background principles of state property law to reach its holding).
59
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that do not require compensation.66 In so doing, the Court expressly
rejected the rationale of the Supreme Court of South Carolina.67 The
South Carolina Supreme Court held that when the regulation is “designed ‘to prevent serious public harm,’” property owners are not entitled to compensation “under the Takings Clause regardless of the
regulation’s effect on the property’s value.”68 The South Carolina
Supreme Court accepted the state legislature’s determination that new
construction on Mr. Lucas’s lot would threaten an important public
resource of the State.69 In contrast, the United States Supreme Court
unequivocally stated that a legislature’s noxious use decree could not
undermine the categorical rule that compensation must be paid when
regulations result in total takings.70 To hold otherwise would compromise the limitations the Court had earlier placed on exercises of
the police power without compensation.71
One reading of the majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court is that by background principles of nuisance, the Court
meant background principles of common law nuisance. The Court
emphasized that on remand:
[T]o win its case South Carolina must do more than
proffer the legislature’s declaration that the uses Lucas
desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the
conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law
maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. . . .
[A] “State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private
property into public property without compensation . .
. .” Instead, as it would be required to do if it sought
to restrain Lucas in a common-law action for public
nuisance, South Carolina must identify background
principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit
the uses he now intends in circumstances in which the
property is presently found. Only on this showing can
the State fairly claim that, in proscribing all such beneficial uses, the Beachfront Management Act is taking
66

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
Id.
68
Id. at 1010.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1026.
71
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922)).
67
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nothing.72
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion addresses this reading of the
majority opinion. Justice Kennedy opines that in determining which
reasonable, investment-backed expectations the Constitution will protect through the Takings Clause, our entire legal tradition must necessarily be considered.73 “The common law of nuisance is too narrow a
confine for the exercise of regulatory power” and the states “should
not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives” that respond to our interdependent, complex and changing society. 74 Moreover, he criticizes the Supreme Court of South Carolina for citing
general purposes supporting the enactment of the Beachfront Management Act without also making findings that the regulation was
consistent with the property owner’s reasonable expectations of use.75
Justices Stevens and Blackmun criticize the majority’s nuisance exception as elevating common law nuisance over statutory
nuisance.76 The majority states that any regulation that denies all
economically beneficial use of the regulated property “cannot be
newly legislated or decreed (without compensation).”77 Such a regulation “must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that
could have been achieved in the courts . . . under the State’s law of
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.”78 Justice Stevens writes that the Court’s decision “effectively freezes the
State’s common law, denying the legislature much of its traditional
power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property.”79
And, Justice Blackmun rejects any common law limitation on the
State’s authority to regulate, without compensation, under the nuisance doctrine.80 He argues that common law courts frequently rejected such a limited understanding of the State’s power and that the

72

Id. at 1031-32; see also Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 631 (demonstrating one of the successful
Lucas nuisance abatement cases discussed in Part II, stating the Lucas nuisance exception
was limited to common law nuisances).
73
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
74
Id. at 1035.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1053-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77
Lucas, 505 U.S at 1029 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
78
Id. (emphasis added).
79
Id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80
Id. at 1059-60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Takings Clause imposes no such limitation.81 He rejects the majority’s narrowing of the nuisance doctrine in takings jurisprudence and
instead relies upon precedent that recognizes the authority “for the
legislature to interpose, and by positive enactment to prohibit a use of
property which would be injurious to the public.”82
Justice Souter anticipated these nuisance abatement type cases
in his Lucas statement. He wrote that the Court’s opinion assumes
cases may arise in which nuisance abatement under state law could
deny all economically beneficial use of land.83 He was skeptical of
the Court’s accuracy, stating:
The nature of nuisance law . . . indicates that application of a regulation defensible on grounds of nuisance
prevention or abatement will quite probably not
amount to a complete deprivation in fact. The nuisance enquiry focuses on conduct, not on the character
of the property on which that conduct is performed,
and the remedies for such conduct usually leave the
property owner with other reasonable uses of his property. Indeed it is difficult to imagine property that can
be used only to create a nuisance, such that its sole
economic value must presuppose the right to occupy it
for such seriously noxious activity.84
II.

APPLYING THE NUISANCE EXCEPTION—FOUR SUCCESSFUL
LUCAS TAKINGS CHALLENGES

Many private property rights advocates lauded the results of
the Lucas decision and hoped that the case would infuse land use
control with greater private property rights protections.85 In contrast,
81

Id.
Lucas, 505 U.S at 1059 (quoting Commonwealth v. Tewsbury, 52 Mass. 55, 57 (1
Cush. 1846).
83
Id. at 1077 (statement of Souter, J.).
84
Id. at 1077-78 (citations omitted).
85
See generally Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise
of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321
(2005). See also Nancie G. Marzulla, A Two-Front Battle for Property Rights, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sept. 18, 1992), http://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0918/18191
.html/(page)/2 (“There is little in the Lucas opinion for opponents of private-property rights
to be happy about.”); Tom Kenworthy & Kirstin Downey, South Carolina May Have to Pay
Compensation in Property Case, WASH. POST, June 30, 1992, available at 1992 WLNR
5574135.
82
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some environmentalists and Supreme Court “watchers” doubted the
case’s promise for real impact.86 Even as the Court announced the
categorical takings test, it predicted that the Lucas decision would
apply in “relatively rare situations”87 and only under the most “extraordinary circumstance[s].”88 The following statutory nuisance
abatement cases represent one quarter of one percent of all the cases
in which property owners succeeded in making the Lucas challenge.
First, in City of Seattle v. McCoy89 the City brought a proceeding to abate the McCoys’ operation of their lounge and restaurant
(Oscar’s II) under a drug nuisance statute.90 The McCoys’ property
interest was a leasehold on the property on which Oscar’s II was located.91 Oscar’s II was found to be a drug nuisance by the trial court
and it was ordered closed for one year.92 The trial court’s order resulted in Oscar’s II being place in the court’s custody pursuant to an
applicable statutory provision.93 On appeal, the court found that application of the nuisance statute to the McCoys was a temporary taking.94 The court articulated the nuisance exception as “whether the
common law of nuisance would have allowed abatement of the lawful business activity against an innocent owner for the illegal drug activities of unidentified business patrons which, when the activities
occurred, were unknown and may not have been observable.”95 The
court determined that the McCoys were innocent owners, that they
acted reasonably to attempt to abate the nuisance, and that the com86
See generally Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme
Court Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 523 (1995) (reviewing state court cases relying on the Lucas
decision and stating that the vast majority do not find regulatory takings); see Lazarus, supra
note 34, at 23 (stating that the Lucas “opinion was virtually ‘dead on arrival’ in terms of its
potential to establish significant precedent favorable to the property rights movement.”); but
see Victoria Sutton, Constitutional Taking Doctrine – Did Lucas Really Make a Difference?,
18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 505, 516-17 (2001) (discussing Lucas’s narrow direct application
but its “profound indirect impacts”).
87
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
88
Id. at 1017.
89
4 P.3d 159 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
90
Id. at 161.
91
Id. at 162.
92
Id. at 161.
93
Id.
94
McCoy, 4 P.3d at 166-67 (“By virtue of the abatement order . . . the building [is] in the
custody of the court. Therefore, the McCoys are not in possession. They cannot put the
property to any economically viable use pending the expiration of one year . . . .”).
95
Id. at 167.
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mon law nuisance exception in that state was based upon whether the
owners, given their constructive and actual knowledge, took reasonable steps to abate the nuisance.96 The court held that the City did not
meet its burden of proving a common law nuisance according to the
Lucas exception.97
McCoy was the only nuisance exception case in which the
owner restricted the denominator by acquiring only a leasehold interest.98 The First English dissent likely imagined this type of case
when describing the qualities of temporary Lucas takings.99 A leasehold of sufficiently short remaining duration and a sufficiently
lengthy nuisance abatement closure when combined with other factors such as insufficient tailoring and acquiescence or participation by
the owner in the nuisance activity might be sufficient to overcome the
First English dissent and the Tahoe-Sierra Court’s caution against
temporal segmentation in the application of the Lucas categorical rule
and its nuisance exception.100
Second, City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen101 involved application of a nuisance abatement statute to the property owner’s fifteenunit apartment complex.102 Mr. Bowen owned a fee simple in the
apartment complex which was ordered closed for one year after being
found to constitute a statutory nuisance because of purported drug use
by tenants of the apartment complex and others who were on the
property.103 The court found a temporary Lucas taking because the
building could not be put to any economic use during the one-year
closure period.104 The court stated that the Lucas exception limited
the matter to common law nuisances and that no common law nuisance doctrine prohibited using a building for rental purposes.105
96

Id. at 171.
Id. at 171-72.
98
See supra Part II.
99
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing regulations that “remain in effect for a significant percentage of the property’s
useful life.”).
100
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 315 (finding that Penn Central and not Lucas was the appropriate takings test to apply after considering the temporary nature of the regulation and
the “average holding time” of the property in question).
101
675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
102
Id at 629.
103
Id. at 627-28.
104
Id. at 629; see supra Part I-A (discussing the value versus use interpretations of the
Lucas opinion).
105
Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 631.
97
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Third, Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami106 consolidated two cases, City of St. Petersburg v. Kablinger107 and City of Miami v.
Keshbro108 (“the Stardust Motel”). The property interest held by the
owners was a fee simple absolute in an apartment complex and in a
motel, respectively. In both cases, the court found that the closure
orders deprived the owners of all economically beneficial use of their
property.109 The issue for the court and the reason for the different
ultimate results was the question of specific tailoring of the closure
orders to “abate the objectionable conduct, without unnecessarily infringing upon the conduct of a lawful enterprise.”110
The court found that the regulation in Kablinger was a Lucas
categorical taking and that the Lucas nuisance exception did not apply.111 But, in Keshbro, the court said the nuisance exception did apply and was a defense to the property owner’s claim of a Lucas categorical taking.112 The six-month temporary closing of the apartment
in Kablinger, according to the court, was not attended by the same
extensive record indicating that the nuisance (drug activity) had become inextricable from the operation of the Stardust Motel in
Keshbro.113 Absent such a record, the court found the closure order
for one year in Kablinger was not sufficiently tailored to benefit from
the Lucas nuisance exception.114 In contrast, the court found that the
drug and prostitution activity at the Stardust Motel in Keshbro had
become “part and parcel” of the Stardust’s operation and that the City
of Miami had failed to eradicate this nuisance activity despite patient
attempts.115
Finally, the Ohio case of State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah116 involved three consolidated cases in which the property interest was a
fee simple absolute in residential property.117 In all three cases, it
was alleged that non-owner residents, while occupying three different
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

801 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001).
730 So. 2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
717 So. 2d 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, 801 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001).
Keshbro, 801 So. 2d at 868-70.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 876-77.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 876-77.
Keshbro, 801 So. 2d at 877.
Id. at 876.
702 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio 1998).
Id. at 83, 85.
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residential properties, committed drug-related felonies.118 Each property owner was found to have taken affirmative, good faith action to
investigate and remove offending residents.119 The court found that
application of the nuisance abatement statute was a taking as it required, upon the finding of a nuisance, the issuance of a temporary,
one-year closure order forbidding use of the property for any purpose.120 Additionally, the court held that in each of the three cases,
the closings, under the facts, would be unconstitutional forfeitures
and seizures of property in violation of the federal Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.121
The court distinguished these cases from Bennis v. Michigan122 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that forfeiture of property, even as applied to good-faith property owners, was not a Fifth
Amendment Taking requiring the government to pay compensation
because such property is acquired, not by the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, but through forfeiture.123
The court distinguished Bennis from the facts of this case in
four ways. First, the court said the plaintiff in Bennis conceded that
her property was subject to civil forfeiture and only argued the issue
of compensation; therefore, the Court was not required to “evaluate
the propriety of the forfeiture itself.”124 Second, it was important to
the majority in Bennis that the statutory framework allowed judicial
discretion to determine the propriety of the forfeiture; in contrast, the
Ohio statutory framework did not allow for a similar exercise of discretion.125 Third, unlike the property owners in State ex rel. Pizza,
the property owner in Bennis did not offer evidence of affirmative actions that she took to avoid having her property used for an illegal
purpose nor did she offer evidence of any action that she took to
118

Id. at 83-86.
Id. at 85-86.
120
Id. at 88-89.
Nor is the closure-order provision saved from constitutional infirmity by
the availability of judicial release through the filing of a bond in the full
value of the property. Deprivation of the use of resources equal to the
value of the property is as much a taking as is deprivation of the use of
the property itself.
Pizza, N.E.2d at 88.
121
Id. at 86.
122
516 U.S. 442 (1996).
123
Pizza, 702 N.E.2d at 90-91; Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452.
124
Pizza, 702 N.E.2d at 90.
125
Id. at 91.
119
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abate the use of her property for an illegal purpose.126 And finally,
the court noted that the remedial objectives achieved through forfeiture in the Bennis case, revenue generation, though concededly modest, would not be achieved by a temporary closure.127
Interestingly, the state decisions discussing the Lucas taking
in the nuisance abatement context all involve statutory nuisances.
Despite the apprehension about statutory nuisances that can be read
into the Lucas majority opinion,128 subsequent courts and scholars
seem to have accepted that the decision is not limited to common law
nuisances.129 However, these cases do not turn on the distinction between common law and statutory nuisances that Justices Stevens and
Blackmun emphasize in their dissents.130 The state courts, in their
analysis of the merits, tend to emphasize the breadth of the application of the nuisance statute (the extent to which non-nuisance activities are also prohibited) and the bona fides of the property owners.131
Additionally, a common theme in the nuisance abatement
cases is the courts’ insistence upon specific tailoring and circumspectness in the application of nuisance abatement statutes and temporary closure orders, especially in the context of property owners
who were not involved in the conduct that was the subject of the statute. Absent this specific tailoring, the courts have declined to apply
the nuisance exception.132
Finally, the denominator issue and the whole parcel rule were
not prevalent in these nuisance abatement cases. One reading of these
decisions is that the state courts essentially determined to abandon the
whole parcel rule and treat the Lucas decision as a categorical rule of
compensation upon a total deprivation of all use for a temporary pe126

Id.
Id.
128
See supra Part I-C.
129
See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 85, at 334. (“Some lower courts seem to have taken Justice Kennedy's concurrence to heart, ruling that ‘background principles’ nuisances include
more than just the common law variety.”); Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct “Spin”
on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1426 (1993) (stating that “the majority’s intimations that
the background principles must be supplied by judge-made common law, rather than by legislative or regulatory enactment, will probably not survive review in the future.”).
130
See supra Part I-C.
131
See supra Part II.
132
In the spirit of Justice Souter’s observation on this point, in Keshbro, Inc. v. City of
Miami, the court found in one of the two consolidated cases that the nuisance exception did
apply because the nuisance activity could not be extricated from the non-nuisance activity
and therefore, the order of closure was reasonable. See supra notes 77, 79, and accompanying text.
127
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riod of time. The next logical step was to temporally segment the
property, which allowed the temporary abatement of all use pursuant
to the nuisance abatement statutes to trigger the temporary Lucas takings that the courts found in most of the cases.
III.

LESSONS LEARNED

Prospectively, these statutory nuisance abatement cases hold
little traction for enhancing private property rights protections because they ignore, even subvert, the whole parcel rule and the temporary takings guidance proffered by the Supreme Court and federal
courts since these cases were decided. First, all of the statutory nuisance cases were decided prior to 2002 when the United States Supreme Court decided Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.133 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the Lucas challenge to development moratoria totaling thirty-two months and concluded that the Penn Central134
regulatory takings balancing test should be applied to the facts instead.135 The Court rejected temporal segmentation and admonished
that the denominator in regulatory takings cases should consist of the
whole parcel, stating, “[l]ogically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because
the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”136
The Court concluded that in cases such as the one before it, where
property owners were faced with prospectively temporary takings, the
focus should be on the whole parcel, not a temporal slice, and the
analysis should be under Penn Central and not Lucas.137
The significance of the temporary nature of the taking to the
Tahoe-Sierra Court should not be underplayed. Lucas was a permanent and unconditional takings case under the statute as written at the
time the case was heard by the South Carolina Supreme Court. 138 In
contrast, all of the statutory nuisance cases were expressly and pro-

133
The case was decided on April 23, 2002. 535 U.S. 302. The decision in City of Seattle
v. McCoy, the most recent of the nuisance abatement cases, was filed on April 1, 2002. 48
P.3d 993 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
134
438 U.S. 104.
135
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334.
136
Id. at 332.
137
Id. at 329, 342.
138
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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spectively temporary closures and argued as temporary takings.139
Post Tahoe-Sierra, these prospectively and expressly temporary regulatory takings claims will be difficult to win under the Lucas analysis
where the property owner owns the property in fee.
While the federal courts have not foreclosed the possibility of
temporary categorical takings, the area has been circumscribed.140 In
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angles, California, the United States Supreme Court held that
temporary takings are compensable.141 The Court cited several physical takings cases as “reflect[ing] the fact that ‘temporary’ takings
which . . . deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different
in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly
requires compensation.”142 However, the dissent noted that the physical takings cases were “inapposite” for the proposition that temporary and permanent takings are indistinguishable and further observed
that for a temporary restriction to effect a taking, the regulatory restriction must be substantial and effective “for a significant percentage of the property’s useful life.”143
First English Evangelical was, and is, a significant Supreme
Court decision because of its contribution to establishing the compensability of temporary takings. Though decided more than a decade before all but one of the four nuisance exception cases, the state
courts virtually ignored the decision, with the exception of the court

139

See supra Part II.
Res. Invs. Inc., 85 Fed. Cl. at 481-82.
Further contrary to defendant's argument, the Federal Circuit has continually refused to hold that categorical treatment is inapposite for a temporary taking, despite numerous opportunities and invitations to do so. In
the context of a physical invasion, to which the Supreme Court compared the totality of the taking in Lucas, “‘permanent’ does not mean
forever, or anything like it. A taking can be for a limited term-what is
‘taken’ is, in the language of real property law, an estate for years, that
is, a term of finite duration as distinct from the infinite term of an estate
in fee simple absolute.”
Id.; see infra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent’s articulation of when a
temporary taking can rise to the level of a categorical taking).
141
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 318.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Seiber v. United States, 364 F.3d 1356,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“In Boise Cascade we explained that the Supreme Court may have
only ‘rejected [the] application of the per se rule articulated in Lucas to temporary development moratoria,’ and not to temporary takings that result from the rescission of a permit requirement or denial.”) (citations omitted).
140
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in Keshbro, Inc. v. Miami.144 The court in Keshbro distinguished
First English from the nuisance abatement cases, stating that the
property owners in the nuisance abatement cases were “being deprived of a property’s dedicated use” unlike in First English, a temporary moratoria case.145 Thus, the court effectively ignored the
whole parcel rule and treated prospectively temporary regulations as
the equivalent of retrospectively temporary regulations for purposes
of the Lucas takings analysis.146
Moreover, to the extent that the Lucas categorical rule only
applies when there is complete loss of value, temporary elimination
of use under the statutory foreclosure statutes with retention of future
use and therefore speculative future value would seem to foreclose
the Lucas challenge and require the Penn Central kind of analysis. In
regulatory takings matters, “the parcel as a whole” analysis is the
federal standard.147 Thus, with this understanding, there can only be
a Lucas categorical regulatory taking if the land as a whole parcel is
deprived of all value or use.
CONCLUSION
The structure of the Lucas opinion itself and of subsequent
Supreme Court decisions places substantial, contemporary, limitations on the viability of the Lucas takings claim in the statutory nuisance abatement context. Most of the successful Lucas challenges
are special circumstances cases in which an intervening act or circumstance triggers the Lucas taking. The statutory nuisance abatement cases are likely outliers and prospectively hold little potential
for enhancing private property rights protections in the future.

144
145
146
147

Keshbro, 801 So. 2d at 873-74.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 873-74.
Lost Tree Vill. Corp., 707 F.3d at 1292-93; Seiber, 364 F.3d at 1368.
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